By George Tsebelis

This publication issues out that the interplay among the chambers in bicameral legislatures is important to realizing habit in each one chamber, some degree overlooked in prior reports. It surveys bicameral associations from quite a few nations and provides versions that specify the importance of alternative institutional preparations. those hypotheses are illustrated and demonstrated with information from the French 5th Republic, and supplemented with facts from Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the us, and the ecu Union.

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1961: 404). And the Senate reduced corruption because it " double [d] the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient" (Hamilton et al. 1961: 378-79). Finally, Madison also noted "the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions" (Hamilton et al. 1961: 378-79). " In the republican debates at the end of the eighteenth century, the justifications for a dual legislative system still acknowledged both a political dimension and an efficiency dimension, but that connection begins to be severed.

1961: 405). Legislative quality is affected by the expertise and training of legislators, as well as by their potential for corruption. A senate offered a solution to both these problems. The longer electoral terms of the senators permitted them to become "professional legislators who were better supplied with a knowledge of the means by which [the object of good government] can best be obtained" (Hamilton et al. 1961: 404). And the Senate reduced corruption because it " double [d] the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient" (Hamilton et al.

Madison also describes the "mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be" (Hamilton et al. 1961: 380). " The Senate became the anchor for legislation subject to the changing preferences of the lower house that arise from either the "rapid succession of new members" or the advent of "sudden and violent passions" (Hamilton et al. 1961: 405). Legislative quality is affected by the expertise and training of legislators, as well as by their potential for corruption.

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